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A Constitution at a Crossroads: A Conversation 
with the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa 
 
Drew F. Cohen* 
“It doesn’t matter how progressive the Constitution is.  It cannot, just 
because it is operative, touch me, in my house to the point where I 
automatically begin to understand how my white brothers and sisters think 
and what I need to do to relate to them better.  Some practical steps must 
be taken and we, as a nation, must also be encouraged to take them so that 
. . . [t]he ‘ubuntu’ or that spirit of sharing of humanity, of oneness, that the 
1993 constitution provided for . . . [can] permeate across society.”  
-Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa, Mogoeng Mogoeng, September 4, 2013.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
¶1  Shortly before the first chapter of South Africa’s grand constitutional democratic 
experiment was to draw to a close with the passing of the country’s first black president 
and revered humanitarian, Nelson Mandela,2 the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa graciously granted the author an informal interview to discuss some of 
the most pressing challenges facing both the court and the country as it embarks on the 
next phase of its transformative endeavor.  To that end, this article provides insight into 
the court’s and country’s current controversies, including institutional accountability, 
social transformation and affirmative action, and judicial selection, as well as the 
responsibilities of leading the judiciary of a progressive constitutional democracy in the 
South African regional community. 
¶2  On October 11, 1996, two-and-a-half years after a remarkably peaceful and abrupt 
transition from its authoritative past, South Africans enacted a final Constitution designed 
                                                        
*
 Drew F. Cohen, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, 2012.  In writing this article, I was 
fortunate to draw upon my experiences as a 2013 foreign law clerk to Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng of 
the South African Constitutional Court. I acknowledge the institutional support of Professor Scheherazade 
Rehman of the George Washington University and the European Union Research Center. Finally, I 
appreciate the diligence of Northwestern Law’s Journal of International Human Rights editors, in particular 
the Managing Articles Editor, Katherine G. Klein, in preparing this Article for publication. 
1
 Interview with Mogoeng Mogoeng, Chief Justice, CC of S. Afr., Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Sept. 4, 2013). 
2
 Nelson Mandela, “the father of the nation,” died on December 5, 2013, three months after the interview 
with the Chief Justice was conducted.  Nelson Mandela Dies, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-05-nelson-mandela-dies. 
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to redress the country’s past injustices.3  In order to secure the new democratic initiative, 
the framers enshrined the Constitution with a bill of twenty-seven modern rights.  Unlike 
almost any other people on earth,4 South Africans have a constitutional right to privacy, 
housing, healthcare, and education.5  The government cannot discriminate against them 
on the basis of “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language 
and birth.”6  South African children have their own set of specific rights.  The new 
supreme law provided that every child has the right to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care services and social services” and “to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, 
abuse or degradation.”7  Commentators have characterized the text as among the most 
progressive ever constructed.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested that the Egyptians, 
when drafting their post-Arab Spring Constitution in 2012, model it based on the South 
African Constitution rather than the United States’ founding document.  The Constitution 
of South Africa, she said, “was a deliberate attempt to have a fundamental instrument of 
government that embraced basic human rights, had an independent judiciary . . . It really 
is, I think, a great piece of work that was done.”8 
¶3  As if to press a “reset button” from an era of “parliamentary sovereignty” under 
apartheid,9 the autochthonous text installed a new apex court—the Constitutional 
                                                        
3
 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 pmbl., reprinted in OXFORD CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 
1997) [hereinafter S. AFR. CONST. 1996] (proclaiming that South Africans “[r]ecognise the injustices of 
[their] past” and therefore adopt a Constitution to, inter alia, “[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights . . .”).  See also S. AFR. 
(INTERIM) CONST., 1993, Epilogue (envisaging national unity and reconciliation); Azanian Peoples Org. 
(AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) (S. Afr.) (interpreting the 
epilogue). This and all South African Constitutional Court cases are available online at the Court’s official 
website: http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za.  
4
 See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the 
South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 323 (2007) (“Although some other 
countries' constitutions enumerate socio-economic rights, few countries' courts have found such rights to be 
fully and directly justiciable, and even fewer have multiple, affirmative social rights opinions. No other 
country has developed their case law sufficiently to outline a comprehensive jurisprudence.”); Henry J. 
Richardson III, Patrolling the Resource Transfer Frontier: Economic Rights and the South African 
Constitutional Court's Contributions to International Justice, 9 AFR. STUD. Q. 81, 81 (2007), 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v9/v9i4a6.pdf (describing South Africa’s 1996 Constitution as the “the most 
rights-protective in the world.”).  
5
 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 14, 26, 27, 29. 
6
 Id. at § 9(3).  
7
 Id. at § 28(1)(c)-(d).  
8
 Real Clear Politics, Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Egypt: Don’t Use US Constitution As A Model (Feb. 3, 
2012), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/02/03/ruth_bader_ginsburg_to_egypt_dont_use_us_constituti
on_as_a_model.html. See also Adam Liptak, ‘We the People’ Loses Appeal with People Around the World, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-loses-appeal-with-
people-around-the-world.html (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
9
 See, e.g., Sachs v. Minister of Justice; Diamond v. Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11 (A) at 37 (S. Afr.) 
(upholding “the plain principle that Parliament may make any encroachments it chooses upon the life, 
liberty or property of any individual subject to its sway, and that it is the function of courts of law to 
enforce its will.”). 
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Court10—with the power to invalidate any “law or conduct” inconsistent with the 
Constitution.11  The eleven justices,12 who, in theory,13 broadly reflect “the racial and 
gender composition of South Africa”14 are appointed to a non-renewable, twelve-year 
term or serve until he or she reaches the mandatory retirement age of seventy.15  
Although the Chief Justice and his or her Deputy Chief Justice are the titular leaders of 
the Court, members of the bench consider and carry themselves as equals.  Caseloads are 
divided evenly amongst the justices and consents and disagreements carry equal weight 
in the conference as well as in judgment.  In an outward, public display that symbolizes 
this parity, justices sit on the same plane during hearings—with no one justice elevated 
above his or her peers—and, aside from the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice who 
sit in the center, associate justices are randomly assigned different seats before each 
hearing. 
¶4  The early Constitutional Court16 quickly set about to actualize the post-conflict 
constitutional principles and handed down a series of celebrated cases17 that addressed 
structural injustices brought about by decades of gross poverty, disease, and inequality.  
In one of its first judgments, it outlawed the death penalty,18 and soon thereafter, in 
perhaps the first bench’s most significant social rights decision, forced the government to 
provide impoverished citizens expeditious access to “adequate housing.”19  In another 
early landmark social rights case, The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),20 the Court 
ordered the government to provide antiretroviral medicines to prevent the transmission of 
HIV from infected mothers to their infants at birth.  Pursuant to the fundamental 
constitutional principles of equality and dignity, the Court also invalidated the common 
                                                        
10
 The Constitutional Court was established by the interim Constitution in 1993, but President Nelson 
Mandela only formally opened the Court on February 14, 1995, the day before it heard its first case (S v. 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.) (invalidating the death penalty)).   
11
 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 2. See also id. at § 167(5) (announcing that the Constitutional Court is the “final” 
arbiter for determining the constitutional validity of an act of Parliament and conduct of the President). 
12
 Id. at § 167(1) (stipulating that the Court will be composed of a Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and 
nine other associate justices).  
13
 The Court’s current, permanent composition includes six black males, three white males and two black 
females.  Justice Kate O’Regan, who served from 1994 until her term expired in 2009, is the only white 
female to have served on the bench.  For a list of the current justices and their biographies, see Current 
Judges, THE CONST. COURT OF S. AFR., 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/currentjudges.htm. 
14
 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 174(2). 
15
 Id. at § 176(1). 
 
16
 The “early Constitutional Court” or “first bench” refers to the period from the establishment of the Court 
under the interim Constitution to the retirement of its first chief justice, Arthur Chaskalson, on May 31, 
2005. 
17
 See, e.g., Howard W. French, South Africa’s Supreme Court Abolishes Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (June 
7, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/07/world/south-africa-s-supreme-court-abolishes-death-
penalty.html (reporting on the Constitutional Court’s first major ruling that banned the death penalty); 
South Africa to have gay weddings, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4487756.stm. 
18
 S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
19
 Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
20
 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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law definition of marriage insomuch as it did not include same-sex couples21 and, on 
similar grounds, banned the common law offense of sodomy.22  
¶5  Almost two decades since its inception, however, the perception of the Court and 
the Constitution as irreproachable agents of social transformation23 has flagged.  Perhaps, 
given the deep socioeconomic inequalities the Court confronted, a perceivable decline is 
only natural.  One of the challenges in adopting an aspirational constitution is squaring its 
progressive rights with socioeconomic realities.24  The institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary is only as strong as the capacity of the government to effectively and efficiently 
implement its rulings and the will of the people to follow them.25   When social progress 
stagnates or fails to keep pace with expectations, the legitimacy of the institutions that 
hold themselves out as the champions of transformation are questioned. 
¶6  The void between what the Court and the Constitution guarantee and the realities in 
the townships on the outskirts of cities, remains vast.  Irene Grootboom, of the landmark 
socio-economic rights case that forced government to provide adequate housing, died 
homeless, still waiting for state accommodations eight years after the ruling.26  Although 
the TAC case required the government to supply free antiretroviral drugs, 10% of the 
population, more than any other country, and over a quarter of all South African 
schoolgirls, is HIV positive.27  The Court has sought to protect and provide pupils 
meaningful access to schools28 and the Constitution explicitly guarantees every child’s 
                                                        
21
 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
22
 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
23
 See, e.g., S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 152 para. 262 (S. Afr.) (“What the Constitution 
expressly aspires to do is to provide a transition from these grossly unacceptable features of the past to a 
conspicuously contrasting . . . future . . .”); Du Plessis and Others v. De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 
850 (CC) at 108 para. 157 (S. Afr.) (describing the Constitution as “a document that seeks to transform the 
status quo ante into a new order . . .”). 
24
 For a discussion on the feasibility of legally enforcing socio-economic rights, see generally Ellen Wiles, 
Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic Rights in National Law, 22 
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35 (2006). 
25
 In late 2012, the Economist tartly observed that “[s]ince Mr[.] Mandela retired in 1999, the country has 
been woefully led.”  Under Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s current leader, the ruling party “has sought to 
undermine the independence of the courts, the police, the prosecuting authorities and the press.” Sad South 
Africa: Cry, the Beloved Country, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21564846-south-africa-sliding-downhill-while-much-rest-
continent-clawing-its-way-up.  See also Xolani Mbanjwa, Thuli Madonsela: How Ministers Obstructed 
Nkandla Probe, CITY PRESS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/thuli-madonsela-
ministers-obstructed-nkandla-probe/ (reporting that Ministers in President Zuma’s cabinet attempted to 
“obstruct” the Public Protector’s investigation into corruption allegations regarding R206 million upgrades 
to the President’s private residence). 
26
 Pearlie Joubert, Grootboom Dies Homeless and Penniless, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2008), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-homeless-and-penniless (remarking that “Grootboom’s 
death ‘and the fact that she died homeless shows how the legal system and civil society failed her.’”). 
27
 South Africa: ‘Over 25% of Schoolgirls HIV Positive’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21783076 (reporting 28% of South African female students are 
HIV positive, according to the South African Health Minister); Barry Bearak, South Africa Fears Millions 
More H.I.V. Infections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/world/africa/20safrica.html.  For additional health statistics for South 
Africa see South Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/countries/zaf/en/.  
28
 See, e.g., Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v. Welkom High School 
and Another; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v. Harmony High School 
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right to an education, yet a recent report found that South Africa’s Basic Education 
Department “allocated only about half the money needed in 2013/14 to supply all pupils 
with textbooks in each subject that they study.”29  Shortly after the Court struck down the 
common law definition of marriage, Parliament legalized same-sex marriage in 
November 2006—making South Africa the first and only country on the continent to do 
so30—and the country celebrated its first open traditional Zulu gay wedding in April 
2013,31 but instances of violent assaults, including “corrective rapes,”32 against 
homosexuals persist with alarming frequency.  The country has one of the highest rates of 
violent crimes in the world and instances of rape and sexual assault have increased in 
recent years.33  
¶7  Under these sobering societal and political conditions, sixteen years after the ink on 
the parchment had dried, the current chief justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, assumed 
stewardship of the Constitutional Court.   Mogoeng was first appointed in 2009 as an 
associate justice along with three others to fill the vacancies of four departing judicial 
stalwarts from the first bench whose terms were expiring.34  He began his legal career as 
a High Court prosecutor in Mafikeng from 1986 until 1990, after obtaining a Juris B 
degree from the University of Zululand and an LLB at the University of Natal.  Mogoeng 
rose through the judiciary, first serving as a member of the now-defunct Industrial Court, 
then as a judge of the North West High Court, and as its Judge President in 2002.  After 
serving less than two years as an associate justice, President Zuma announced Mogoeng 
as his choice for the Constitutional Court’s fourth chief justice, which was confirmed on 
September 8, 2011.35   
¶8  In September 2013, during the midst of the Court’s third term, Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng discussed his thoughts on leading one of the most dynamic and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Another [2013] ZACC 25; 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC) (S. Afr.) (invalidating a school policy that 
expelled pregnant learners).  
29
 Bongani Nkosi, South Africa’s Hidden Textbook Crisis, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Aug. 23, 2013, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-23-00-south-africas-hidden-textbook-crisis. 
30
 Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RESEARCH (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/16/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/ (finding that South Africa is 
one of only sixteen countries in the world that grant legal recognition to same-sex marriages).   
31
 Mandy De Waal, My Big Fat Gay Zulu Wedding, DAILY MAVERICK (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-04-09-my-big-fat-gay-zulu-wedding. 
32
 Lee Middelton, ‘Corrective Rape’: Fighting a South African Scourge, TIME (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2057744,00.html (“South Africa should be a beacon of 
tolerance. Its constitution was the first in the world to outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation . . . 
But in the townships on the city's outskirts, another reality reigns. The rate of violence against women in 
South Africa is among the highest in the world.”). 
33
 Mark Rosenberg, Countries at the Crossroads: South Africa, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0. For the most recent official 
crime statistics for South Africa, see Crime Statistics April 2011—March 2012, S. AFRICAN POLICE SERV. 
(SAPS), 
http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2012/downloads/crime_statistics_presentation.pdf.    
34
 In addition to Mogoeng, Johan Froneman, Christopher Jafta and Sisi Khampepe were appointed to 
replace then Chief Justice Pius Langa, and Justices Yvonne Mokgoro, Kate O’Regan and Albie Sachs.  For 
an account of this transition, see Chris Oxtoby, New Appointments to the Constitutional Court 2009-2012, 
130 S. AFR. L. J. 219 (2013).    
35
 President Zuma Appoints Justice Mogoeng as Chief Justice of the Republic, THE PRESIDENCY, REPUBLIC 
OF S. AFR. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=4821. 
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innovative constitutional democracies.  The interview as presented in this paper is broken 
into two main sections: the first (Subsections A and B of Part II) discusses transformative 
constitutionalism and the second (Subsections C and D of Part II) probes recent 
developments in South African jurisprudence.  To that end, Subsection A considers the 
pace of judicial transformation from a bench that was predominately composed of white 
males to one that broadly reflects the makeup of society.  As chair of the body that 
nominates judicial candidates to the President for appointment, Mogoeng provides 
particular insight into the recent difficulties the Judicial Selection Committee has had in 
attempting to balance the constitutional dictate to transform and diversify the bench with 
the need to promote merit.  The Chief Justice also considers the impact the Constitution 
has had on race relations and to what extent judicial activism plays in creating a more 
egalitarian society. Subsection B explores recent measures taken to improve the 
institutional legitimacy of the judiciary.  The most significant include improving relations 
between the judiciary and the press and restructuring the magistrate’s courts.  
¶9  Subsection C examines how the Constitutional Court canvasses foreign legal 
doctrines and incorporates specific elements to create “distinctly South African” 
jurisprudence.  Finally, Subsection D reflects on the evolving relationship between the 
common law and the Constitution and what responsibilities the Chief Justice has in 
promoting the South African constitutional democracy to the region.  It also assesses the 
disconnect between the sweeping constitutional guarantees and stark inequalities in the 
country and predicts in which area the next social rights legal battle will occur.  What 
follows has been edited and condensed by the author.36  As mentioned above, the 
interview has been split into four thematic subparts. Each subpart begins with a few brief 
paragraphs introducing the subject matter of the interview questions; the questions and 
responses are then provided in italics and paragraphs below.  
II.   THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S JUDICIAL CADENZA37  
A.   Race, Transformation and the South African Judiciary: “We Cannot Afford to be the 
Type of Umpires Chief Justice Roberts had in Mind.” 
¶10  The South African Constitution makes explicit provisions for the appointment of 
judicial officers.38  The appointment criteria, however, is vague: any “appropriate 
qualified” person who is “fit and proper” may serve as a judge.39  The only caveat is 
when appointing judicial officers, consideration must be had for the “need for the 
                                                        
36
 Interview with Mogoeng Mogoeng, Chief Justice, CC of S. Afr., Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Sept. 4, 2013). 
The interview that forms the basis of this Article was conducted over the course of two, one-and-a-half-
hour informal question and answer sessions (one in the morning and the other in the afternoon) in the Chief 
Justice’s judicial chambers at the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Passages have been lightly edited 
for grammar; other syntactic changes appear in brackets.  The thematic subparts of the interview do not 
appear in the order that they were conducted but have been arranged by the author for the benefit of the 
reader.  
37
 See Niren Tolsi, Applause for Mogoeng’s Judicial Cadenza, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-17-applause-for-mogoengs-judicial-cadenza/ (“Two years in, Mogoeng is 
adding strings to his bow and, contrary to the fears at the time of his appointment, he isn't conducting 
judicial manoeuvres in the dark.”).  
38
 See generally S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §174. 
39
 Id. at §174(1). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2014 
 138
judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa.”40  The 
President appoints judges “on the advice of” the Judicial Service Commission (JSC)—a 
body established by the Constitution composed of politicians, academics, attorneys, 
advocates, judges and chaired by the Chief Justice.41  
¶11  The need for the JSC to balance merit with diversity and transformation when 
selecting judicial candidates is a polarizing debate in South Africa.  In April 2013, a 
white male JSC member resigned after his internal discussion paper on transformation, 
concluding that there is “a very real perception in certain quarters that the JSC is, in 
general, set against the appointment of white male candidates except in exceptional 
circumstances,” was leaked to the press.42  On July 6, 2013, the Chief Justice delivered a 
response at the “Advocates for Transformation” annual dinner where he questioned the 
pace and commitment to the appointment of black and female judicial candidates:  
 Of concern to me is, knowing that the apartheid system did, by 
design, empower white male lawyers and disadvantage black and women 
legal practitioners, do these bodies and their individual members have a 
plan and the willpower to transform the professions, not cosmetically but 
radically.  And by transformation I mean, among other things, destroying 
whatever hurdles might still be standing in the way of many women and 
black lawyers joining these professions, by consistently reminding 
government departments, state-funded institutions and big business of the 
need to create equal opportunities for all South African lawyers with a 
favourable disposition towards women and black male practitioners . . . 
 I have come to challenge you . . . to resist all efforts . . . [to equate] 
the appointment of black and women practitioners to the 
institutionalization of mediocrity.  The apparent discomfort with the 
progress we are making in transforming the Judiciary, as if we are about to 
encroach into the no[-]go area of privileged interests, and the concomitant 
boldly declared struggle for “white male” appointment, even if it would 
result in the perpetuation of their historic over-representation, must be 
dealt with decisively.43  
¶12  After the speech, some members of the legal community demanded the Chief 
Justice be impeached for imperiling the impartiality of the JSC.44 Others remarked that as 
                                                        
40
 Id. at §174(2). 
41
 Id. at §178(1). 
42
 Niren Tolsi, JSC’s Izak Smuts Resigns After Transformation Row, MAIL & GUARDIAN, April 12, 2013, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-12-izak-smuts-resigns-after-transformation-row.  
43
 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, The Duty to Transform, Advocates for Transformation Annual 
General Meeting Dinner, THE INSTITUTE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN S. AFR. (July 6, 2013),  
http://www.ifaisa.org/current_affairs/Advocates_for_Transformation_AGM_Dinner.pdf).  
44
 Ernest Mabuza, Hoffman Launched Bid to Impeach Mogoeng, BUS. DAY (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/law/2013/08/07/hoffman-launches-bid-to-impeach-mogoeng (“By 
publicly making and disseminating the speech, the chief justice brought the judiciary of South Africa . . . 
into disrepute in that he descended into the arena of contestation and controversy in respect of issues which 
are pending in the high court and…are likely to require final determination in the Constitutional Court.”); 
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head of the judiciary he was right to speak out in favor of transformation, as it is his 
responsibility to oversee a recalibration of a judiciary, which, in its current composition, 
does not adequately represent the demographics in South African society.45  In remarks at 
a women judges conference in August 2013, law professor Managay Reddi, for instance, 
was dismayed at the legal community’s reticence to discuss the transformation of the 
judiciary: “[the] inherent conservatism and refusal by some culprits of apartheid in the 
legal profession, to share in the responsibility of transformation . . . undeniably accounts 
for the slow pace of transformation in our society, especially in the legal profession and 
the judiciary.”46 The debate over judicial transformation and the JSC will only intensify 
as the Deputy Chief Justice and two associate justices’ terms expire in the next two 
years.47   
¶13  What follows is a discussion about the Chief Justice’s approach to transforming the 
judiciary and his broader philosophy on race relations in South African society. 
¶14  Are you concerned that the pace of the country’s transition from apartheid has 
stagnated?  
¶15  It is a long process; it is a very difficult process that attracts criticism from both 
sides.  The previously disadvantaged believe that we are not transforming as fast as we 
should.  The previously advantaged think that we are being irrational in the way we go 
about our business—we are almost victimizing some of our white compatriots.  But that 
is understandable because it is a very difficult process.  It is also very healthy.  South 
Africans must talk about transformation more and do so openly.  They must articulate 
their feelings in public because we all know that there are issues that must be addressed, 
that there is information that must be disseminated so that the misconceptions people 
might have can be dispelled.   
¶16  Does the South African Constitution adequately address race relations? 
¶17  I think it does.   
¶18  It doesn’t matter how progressive the Constitution is.  It cannot, just because it is 
operative, touch me, in my house to the point where I automatically begin to understand 
how my white brothers and sisters think and what I need to do to relate to them better.  
Some practical steps must be taken and we, as a nation, must also be encouraged to take 
them so that the nation-building and national reconciliation that the 1993 Constitution 
made provisions for can become a reality.  The ubuntu or that spirit of sharing of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Paul Hoffman, Mogoeng: A Most Unsuitable Chief Justice, SUNDAY TIMES (July 28, 2013), 
http://www.ifaisa.org/current_affairs/Mogoeng_a_most_unsuitable_chief_justice-Sunday_Times.pdf 
(“Considering the race and gender of judicial officers in the constitution is a mechanism for sifting 
candidates of equal worth; it should not be abused.”). 
45
 See, e.g., Charl du Plessis, Rights Groups Come Out in Support of Mogoeng, CITY PRESS (Aug. 13, 
2013), http://www.citypress.co.za/news/rights-groups-come-out-in-support-of-mogoeng/ (reporting that 
nine of “most prominent rights organizations” in South Africa issued a press release supporting the Chief 
Justice’s position on transformation); see also Media Release: A Response to the Reactionary Letters by 
Adv. Paul Hoffman SC, HIGHER EDUC. TRANSFORMATION NETWORK (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.hetn.org.za/documents/Press_Release_76_Reactionary_Letters_Against_JSC.pdf (“Merit and 
transformation are two sides of the same coin.”). 
46
 Managay Reddi, Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Law, Address to the 
International Association of Women Judges Conference (Aug. 2013) (transcript on file with the author).  
47
 Justice Thembile Skweyiya’s term expires in 2014, followed by Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke 
and Justice Johann Van der Westhuizen in 2016. 
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humanity, of oneness, that the 1993 Constitution provided for would then be able to 
permeate across society.   
¶19  Programs must exist at the kindergarten level, the primary school level, the high 
school level and, possibly, even at the university level, as well as at workplaces, to ensure 
our children begin to see one another as nothing but fellow human beings, fellow South 
Africans, who should support one another and make sure that this country prospers.  It 
must never be seen as a white country; it must never been seen as a black country. It must 
be seen as a country of South Africans.   
¶20  What is missing, though, are specific measures that could help facilitate a better 
understanding of our different racial groups.  Let me clarify a bit.  Given just how deeply 
divided black and white South Africans were in the past, I think we would have been 
better off had either a national department or a state-funded organization been established 
with the primary responsibility of looking for ways through which the different racial 
groups in South Africa could better understand one another, be more sensitive in their 
relations with one another, and ultimately help reconcile with one another.   
¶21  There seems to be a late-hour awakening by our government . . . led by the 
Department of Arts and Culture.  It has embarked on a social cohesion program that I 
believe is designed to make sure that all South Africans, irrespective of their color and 
gender, focus on what is of mutual benefit, rather than sectarian interests.  So, I think we 
need to accelerate that; we need to make sure there is proper networking among the 
different racial groups.  We need to make sure whatever propaganda the different racial 
groups might have been fed, which causes them to be resistant towards embracing one 
another, is dealt with and dealt with properly.  I think that way you would find South 
Africans blending together much faster than what otherwise would have been the case.   
¶22  During your JSC hearing for Chief Justice, you likened yourself to Chief Justice 
John Roberts.  Do you agree with his assessment that,  “Judges are like umpires. 
Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is 
critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody 
ever went to a ballgame to see an umpire.”48  In other words, is judicial activism 
inappropriate in a constitutional democracy? 
¶23  Former Chief Justice Pius Langa delivered a very moving, very important lecture at 
the University of Stellenbosch a few years ago on “transformative constitutionalism.”49  
                                                        
48
 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.); see 
also Bruce Webber, Umpires v. Judges, NY TIMES (July 11, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html (arguing that since the Roberts 
confirmation proceeding, judges are viewed by the public as “merely arbiters” who are not permitted to “set 
aside precedent and create law but to decide cases on the basis of established law”); Neil S. Siegel, 
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY 701 (2007) (exploring the 
virtues and vulnerabilities of the umpire analogy). 
49
 “[T]here is no single stable understanding of transformative constitutionalism. There must, however, be 
agreement at any rate on some basis for an understanding of transformative constitutionalism. I would 
suggest that the Epilogue . . . to the interim Constitution provides that basis. The Epilogue describes the 
Constitution as providing:  
 
a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by 
strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
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Given our background and our Constitution, judges do not have the luxury to sit back and 
pretend that we do not have serious challenges, which can be addressed through a passive 
justice system.50  I do not think we can afford to be the type of umpires Chief Justice 
Roberts had in mind.   
¶24  Whatever we, as judges, do must facilitate nation-building so far as the case makes 
it possible by actively addressing the socioeconomic challenges that still confront certain 
sectors of the community as well as addressing the position of women in every sector of 
our society.  Whereas that may not be feasible for judges in the U.S., it must [be the case] 
in South Africa.  We have a different set of challenges that require judges to be somewhat 
proactive in the manner in which they approach their judicial responsibilities. 
¶25  And perhaps that’s the way the Constitution was formulated—in terms of being a 
transformative constitution that judges have to take a more active role in order to ensure 
that transformation.  Is that something most judges believe in at the Constitutional 
Court? 
¶26  Absolutely.  Judges across the board—from the high court level to the specialist 
courts—believe that and act in [that manner]. 
¶27  During their confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate, Justices Elana Kagan51 
and Sonia Sotomayor52 spoke of the need for judges to exhibit humility and empathy, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex. 
 
This is a magnificent goal for a Constitution: to heal the wounds of the past and guide us to a better future. 
For me, this is the core idea of transformative constitutionalism: that we must change.” Pius Langa, former 
Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa, Transformative Constitutionalism, Address at Stellenbosch 
University (Oct. 9, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.msu.ac.zw/elearning/material/12571709391238154663Pius%20Langa%20Speech.pdf); see 
also Karl E. Klare, Legal, Cultural and Transformative Constitutionalism 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146, 
150 (1998): 
 
By transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation of course, 
but in a historical contest of conducive political developments) to transforming a 
country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction.  Transformative constitutionalism connotes 
an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through non-violent political 
processes grounded in law.     
  
50
 “It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so of parliament or technical readings of 
legislation as providing justifications for their decisions. Under a transformative constitution judges bear 
the ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions not only by reference to authority, but by reference to 
ideas and values.” Pius Langa, former Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa, Transformative 
Constitutionalism, Address Delivered at Stellenbosch University (Oct. 9, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.msu.ac.zw/elearning/material/12571709391238154663Pius%20Langa%20Speech.pdf). 
51
 The Nomination of Elana Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Elana Kagan, Nominee to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg67622/html/CHRG-111shrg67622.htm.   
52
 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of 
Sonia Sotomayor, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56940/html/CHRG-111shrg56940.htm. 
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respectively. Given South Africa’s recent apartheid past, what role does humility and 
empathy play in judicial-making and how do you reconcile those qualities with the need 
for judges to break from some of the courts’ challenging past precedent? 
¶28 I was criticized for raising humility as an important component of the qualities that we 
require of potential judges.  It is critical in South Africa that judges exhibit humility and 
empathy because when you look at some of the judgments delivered during the apartheid 
era, a good number of judges treated litigants and some practitioners with utter 
disrespect.  The conduct really bordered on unadulterated arrogance.  Most of the time, 
black South Africans were on the receiving end of this kind of judicial conduct.   
¶29  As soon as the 1993 Constitution came into effect, the remarks made by some 
judges that we needed to be courteous to accused persons, that we need to be courteous to 
litigants, that we need to be more helpful to unrepresented people, began to gain 
prominence. If you look at our judgments since 1994, you will realize that humility, 
articulated or unarticulated, is the model of the day.   
¶30  You simply cannot have a situation where judges speak in a manner that 
intimidates witnesses because then they will not be able to give evidence as freely as they 
ought to.  Some witnesses are not educated.  Some do not hold high positions in society.  
A court, by its very nature, is intimidating.  Now, you can imagine in what state witnesses 
are to be left if judges are to harass them and talk down to them in a manner that is 
intimidating.  In South Africa, humility is a critical component for a judge suitable for 
appointment.  You want a friendly atmosphere to prevail. 
¶31 Are there any other traits that you value in a judge? 
¶32 What predominates of course, is that you must be a fit and proper person and that goes to 
merit.  You cannot be appointed to any court unless you have shown that you are a 
competent judicial officer. All other qualities that apply in to judicial candidates in other 
respected democracies, apply with equal force in South Africa.  
B.   The Institutional Legitimacy of South African Court: “The Vast Majority of the 
Public Said, ‘But These are Not Our Courts.  These are White Peoples’ Courts.’”53 
¶33  A 2012 survey conducted by the Human Science Research Council to “establish the 
extent and nature of levels of trust and legitimacy, cooperation and compliance in the 
criminal justice system in South Africa” found that only half of all South Africans 
expressed trust in the courts, down from 57% in 2009.54  Upholding the rule of law rests 
largely on the public’s opinion of the judiciary, shaped, in part, by the press.  The media 
no longer contends with a repressive state apparatus shrouded in secrecy, but court 
reporting challenges persist.  Journalists experience difficulties accessing papers in high 
court proceedings.55  Facts, parties, procedural issues and judgments are mischaracterized 
                                                        
53
 In 1990, there were 829 magistrate judges in South Africa.   Of these, 811 were white, eleven were 
Asian, five were of mixed racial descent and two were “African.” Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Mandela to 
Mthwana: Providing Counsel to the Unrepresented Accused in South Africa, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995). 
54




 Interview with Franny Rabkin, Court Reporter and Legal Commentator, Business Day, in Johannesburg, 
S. Afr. (Sept. 9, 2013).  Before becoming a reporter, Mrs. Rabkin practiced corporate law and served as a 
law clerk at the Constitutional Court of South Africa.  
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as some journalists lack the requisite experience and training in court reporting.56  
Moreover, although South Africa has eleven official languages,57 all Constitutional Court 
proceedings and papers are in English (with an occasional filing in Afrikaans).  
¶34  To this end, the Constitutional Court has taken a series of steps to promote 
transparency, openness and access to the extent that this does not impinge on the dignity 
of litigants or their right to a fair hearing.  At present, the Court interacts with the media 
in a number of ways: permitting media access to its hearings and judgments; allowing 
video cameras in hearings; issuing summaries and notices to the media; responding to 
individual requests from the media; and meeting with the media.   
¶35  In what follows, the Chief Justice discusses his effort to improve the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary.  The most significant measures include improving relations 
between the judiciary and the press and restructuring the magistrate’s courts. 
¶36  The U.S. Supreme Court banned video cameras during hearings.  Does it 
strengthen the judiciary’s legitimacy to allow recordings and media access to Court 
proceedings? 
¶37  We do not bar cameras.  We need to be as transparent as possible.  South Africans 
need to know how their courts operate.  Those with a direct interest in matters before the 
court may not be able to come to court.  We believe that it is necessary that the media 
come to court so that they can report on what actually happens so when the judgment is 
actually delivered people can relate to the outcome based on how they were able to 
follow the daily reporting of the developments.   
¶38  What measures can the Constitutional Court take to improve the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary? 
¶39  You have to remember where the judiciary is coming from.  One of the major 
challenges about legitimacy during the apartheid era was judicial officers at the superior 
court level were almost exclusively male and white.  And the magistracy was no 
exception, except in the Homelands of course where you had a number of black faces 
there.  So the vast majority of the public said, “But these are not our courts.  These are 
white peoples’ courts.  Why are they run almost exclusively by white people?” 
Illegitimacy hinged, fundamentally, on the fact that people could not relate to them.  
They found these courts foreign because people like them were not appointed to positions 
on those courts.  There were remarks of course that judicial officers would sometimes 
make about black people that led them to believe that these are really apartheid courts.  
Why would a judge say about black people that they just stab others with knives 
whenever they feel like it? They have a lust for stabbing other people with knives.58  How 
some of the judicial officers would address black people as Bantus and so on.59  Those 
are some of the things that denuded these courts legitimacy.  Although, there were some 
excellent judicial officers who were really impartial even during the apartheid era.   




 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 6(1).  The eleven official languages are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, 
Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.  
58
 “Commentators have reported judges noting differences in race between victim and defendant, judges 
using tribal custom against blacks, and judges taking judicial notice of the ‘fact’ that blacks have ‘stab lust,’ 
that black women submit to rape without protest, and that blacks who provide alibis are liars.” Ogletree, 
supra note 53, at 18. 
59
 The apartheid government formally referred to black South African derisively as “Bantus” or “natives.” 
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¶40  That said, we still have some challenges with the lower courts.  They enjoy a 
measure of legitimacy but there are still issues to grapple with in relation to their 
legitimacy because they were part and parcel of the Department of Justice before 1994.  
The process of detaching them completely from the Department of Justice is proving to 
be a bit too slow.  There are some responsibilities that the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development still has over the magistracy which tend to make or render its 
legitimacy somewhat questionable.  
¶41  But don’t you think there is a challenge because most people only encounter those 
lower courts? 
¶42  Certainly, that is a problem. Most of the complaints that we hear and read about are 
from the magistrates’ courts.60  It was one of the biggest problems when I took over as 
Chief Justice and remains one of the most difficult issues I still need to contend with.  It 
affects the image of the judiciary.  When people say, “courts do not work,” most of the 
time it is a result of the problems they have experienced with the magistrate courts.  
Remember, most of the courts in this country are magistrates’ courts.  Many people 
hardly ever go beyond a magistrate’s court.  So, the only perception they have of the 
judiciary is based on their experience at the magistrates’ court level.  To some extent, it 
impacts their perception of the Constitutional Court because a “court” is a “court” to 
many people.  Remember, even those South Africans who are “educated” do not know 
much about the court system.  So it does affect the public’s perception of all other courts, 
including the Constitutional Court. 
1. The Application of International Norms and Standards in South African 
Jurisprudence: “We Still Need to Have Regard to the Latest Developments in 
Comparable Jurisdictions.”  
¶43  Unlike in the United States,61 international law plays a pivotal role in South African 
jurisprudence.  The South African Constitution provides a provision that expressly 
authorizes the courts to “consider foreign law” when interpreting the Bill of Rights.62  
Then Justice Kate O’Regan suggested that, so long as it exercised proper precautions, the 
                                                        
60
 See, e.g., Botho Molosankwe, Top Magistrate ‘Abused Her Position’, THE STAR (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/top-magistrate-abused-her-position-1.1558498#.UjsftWTFT49 
(alleging that a chief magistrate required a contract magistrate to “do her hair” and provide transportation to 
a casino); Kamini Padayachee, Clerk Sues Sex Pest Magistrate, THE MERCURY (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/clerk-sues-sex-pest-magistrate-1.1557483#.UjsgamTFT48 
(following up on a retired magistrate who was sentenced to five year imprisonment for sexually assaulting 
a court clerk in his chambers); SAPA, Magistrate’s Rape Remark Probed, IOL NEWS (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/magistrate-s-rape-remark-probed-1.1549127#.UjsiS2TFT49 
(investigating a magistrate’s “shocking” comment about rape in prisons); Zelda Venter, Suspects Freed 
Due to Magistrate’s Threats, PRETORIA NEWS (March 18, 2013), http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/suspects-freed-due-to-magistrate-s-threats-1.1488142#.Ujsio2TFT48 (overturning the conviction of 
two accused thieves after a magistrate concluded they were guilty before the two testified); Sharika 




 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the relevance of 
international law when interpreting the U.S. Constitution).  
62
 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39, cl. 1 (specifying that, “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights,” courts “must 
consider international law” and “may consider foreign law”). 
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Constitutional Court should rely on the law of foreign jurisdiction as an interpretive aid to 
develop its own jurisprudence:  
It is clear that in looking to the jurisprudence of other countries, all the 
dangers of shallow comparativism must be avoided. To forbid any 
comparative review because of those risks, however, would be to deprive 
our legal system of the benefits of the learning and wisdom to be found in 
other jurisdictions. Our courts will look at other jurisdictions for 
enlightenment and assistance in developing our own law. The question of 
whether we will find assistance will depend on whether the jurisprudence 
considered is of itself valuable and persuasive. If it is, the courts and our 
law will benefit. If it is not, the courts will say so, and no harm will be 
done.63 
¶44  A recent study found that foreign law is cited in roughly half of the Court’s most 
recent cases.64  This represents a marked decline from the Court’s first three years, from 
1995 until 1997, when it cited foreign law in seventy-three percent of its judgments.65  
Nonetheless, the Court’s “continued use of foreign authority, after over a decade of 
detailed domestic decisions and far ranging jurisprudence, casts doubt on the theory that 
necessity is the sole reason the Constitutional Court cites foreign law.”66   
¶45  The discussion below examines how the Constitutional Court canvasses foreign 
legal doctrines and incorporates specific elements to create “distinctly South African” 
jurisprudence.    
¶46  What role does international law play in South African jurisprudence?  
¶47  If you examine the judgments of this Court over the years, you will realize that we 
have borrowed quite extensively from jurisdictions such as Canada, Germany and the 
United States as well as from other countries67 that have constitutions that are fairly 
comparable to ours.   
¶48  As South Africa’s constitutional democracy matures and develops its own 
jurisprudence, do you foresee this Court relying less on international law? 
¶49  Yes, there is no doubt about this.  Once our jurisprudence gets settled, once it gets 
to the point that everyone can say that it is fairly well developed, there will be very little 
reason to rely as much as we used to on the jurisprudence of other countries.  With that 
said, obviously, we will still need to have some regard to the latest developments in 
comparable jurisdictions.  This is particularly true with regards to the area of 
socioeconomic rights and property law.  
¶50  The Constitutional Court developed a separation of powers doctrine based, in part, 
on American and French model, but that is often described as “distinctively South 
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 K v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) at para. 35 (S. Afr.). 
64
 Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Lessons from South Africa, 45 
U.S.F. L. REV. 79, 90 (2010). 
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at 91.  
67
 See, e.g., Ferreira v. Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v. Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 
984 (CC) (S. Afr.) (discussing Canadian, German, American and Australian law, at length). 
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African.”68  When developing judicial doctrines for South Africa, how do you choose 
which elements of comparable foreign doctrines to retain and incorporate into your own 
model? 
¶51  The guiding principle will always be what our Constitution requires.  If we come to 
the realization that another branch of government overstepped its bounds, or that there is 
a conflict between a policy made by the Executive or Legislature with our Constitution, 
then we intervene.  We then examine other jurisdictions and ask ourselves how did they 
deal with a similar situation, if ever there is any comparable jurisdiction that has dealt 
with a similar situation.  You may well find that no court has ever dealt with that 
particular situation and that’s when we have to be innovative; we have to be creative and 
fend for ourselves.   
¶52  Building off of that, the U.S. Supreme Court developed what has been termed a 
“political question doctrine” whereby a federal court will decline to entertain a matter 
that raises a political issue.  Do you ever foresee the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
developing a similar doctrine? 
¶53  I doubt we will ever get there. Let me cite an example that will illustrate the extent 
of our co-operational procedures.  We have just delivered the Lindiwe Mazibuko 
judgment,69 which is about whether, in developing its procedures, our National Assembly 
made provisions to regulate processes related to a motion of no confidence in a manner 
that accords with a section of the Constitution.70  Now, in the U.S., it may have been a 
challenge for a court to deal with this matter.  That is not the case in South Africa 
because the Constitution confers on the Constitutional Court powers with such far-
reaching implications that there are very few areas that the Court would be forbidden 
from entering into.  What we cannot do is actually write laws or rules for the National 
Assembly, although we always have the power to say this law, this rule, and this conduct 
of the National Assembly is not consistent with the Constitution and therefore is 
constitutionally invalid. 
                                                        
68
 “I have no doubt that over time our Courts will develop a distinctively South African model of separation 
of powers, one that fits the particular system of government provided for in the Constitution and that 
reflects a delicate balancing, informed both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the 
need, on the one hand, to control government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances and, 
on the other, to avoid diffusing power so completely that the government is unable to take timely measures 
in the public interest.” De Lange v. Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) at para. 60 (S. Afr.). 
69
 Mazibuko v. Sisulu and Another 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
70
 Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, writing for the majority, identified four core constitutional 
issues in the case: “(a) whether the Speaker had the power to schedule a motion of no confidence on his 
own authority; (b) whether the Rules are inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that they do not 
provide for motions of no confidence in the President, as envisaged in section 102(2); (c) whether 
Parliament has failed to fulfill a constitutional obligation, in terms of section 167(4)[(e)] of the 
Constitution, by failing to schedule a motion of no confidence in the President for debate and vote in the 
Assembly within a reasonable time; and (d) whether, in the light of the fact that the National Assembly 
Rules Committee (Rules Committee) is currently reviewing the Rules to provide, inter alia, specifically for 
motions of no confidence brought under section 102, it is necessary for this Court to pronounce on the 
dispute at this stage.”  Id. at para. 3. Further, section 102(2) of the South African Constitution provides: “If 
the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence 
in the President, the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign” 
and section 167(4)(e) states, “Only the Constitutional Court may decide that Parliament or the President has 
failed to fulfill a constitutional obligation . . .” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 102(2), 167(4)(e). 
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¶54  On the U.S. Supreme Court there is a well-known divide between the liberal 
justices and the conservative justices.  Do you ever worry that the South African 
Constitutional Court will have these ideological divides? 
¶55  It is a fear that I have because, speaking for South Africa, I don’t think we should 
ever get to the point where you can predict in advance who is likely to decide how in any 
particular matter. It definitely undermines the judiciary that certain judges should deal 
with issues as if they owe allegiance to anybody or any political party.  In our system, 
unlike in the U.S., however, we do not have justices of the Constitutional Court who were 
sort of sponsored by a particular President, with the support of a particular political party.  
Unlike Congress in the U.S., the South African Parliament does not decide who becomes 
a judge.  Our system involves advocates, attorneys and the academia [in selecting 
judges].  It is not a perfect system, but we think it is structured in such a way as to 
eliminate what informs the challenges behind the predictable ideological split in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
¶56  I would very much like to emulate the German Constitutional Court in this respect.  
Almost always, their decisions are unanimous.  They take time to debate the issues until 
whatever differences might have existed are ironed out.  Although judges are sponsored 
by political parties in the sense that judicial appointments, especially at that level, are 
done exclusively by the German Parliament, which then makes recommendations to the 
appointment authority to appoint, [the judges] have somehow managed to forget about 
the political support they have received [once appointed]. 
2. Challenges and Responsibilities of Applying a Modernist Constitution Predicated on 
Colonial Roman-Dutch Common Law in a Nation with Intractable Socioeconomic 
Inequalities: “I Am Not Sure That We Have The Best Constitution, But I Think We Have 
Something to Offer.”     
¶57  The drafters of the South African Constitution recognized the disconnect between 
the document’s progressive founding principles of egalitarianism and a legal culture 
shrouded in common law and Roman-Dutch tradition, shaped by decades of apartheid 
and centuries of subjugation.  To counterbalance these concerns, the drafters incorporated 
two clauses to empower and obligate judges to “develop” the common law in a spirit 
consistent with the Constitution.  The relevant language of section 39(2) provides that 
“when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights.”71  Without a continual 
reexamination, the common law will neuter the transformative capacity of the Bill of 
Rights thereby perpetuating the status quo.  As noted by Justice Froneman, “[T]he judge 
who fails to examine the existing law with a view to ensuring the effective realization of 
constitutional rights and values . . . is not, as is often presumed by proponents of this 
course, merely neutrally and objectively applying the law . . . More often than not such a 
supine approach will effectively result in a choice for the retention of an unequal and 
unjust status quo.”72  The second development clause, located in section 8(3) requires that 
when giving effect to a right contained in the Bill of Rights a court “must apply, or if 
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 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(2). 
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 Kate v. MEC for the Dep’t of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 745 (SE) at para. 16 (S. Afr.).  
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necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to 
the right.”73 
¶58  Relying on both sections 39(2) and 8(3), the Constitutional Court, in June 2013, 
developed the common law to empower South African domestic courts to register, 
recognize and enforce decisions of regional tribunals where the country had an 
international obligation.74 The matter concerned the expropriation of farmers’ land by the 
government of Zimbabwe pursuant to its land-reform policy.75  The policy, which came 
into force in 2005 through a constitutional amendment, provided for compulsory 
acquisition of identified agricultural land without compensation, save for improvements 
done on the land as well as ousted the jurisdiction of Zimbabwean courts to challenge any 
such confiscations.76  The farmers approached the Southern African Development 
Community Tribunal—the adjudicatory body of a regional economic bloc of fifteen 
southern African member states bound by a treaty to act in accordance with the principle 
of “human rights, democracy and the rule of law”—for relief.77  The Tribunal ruled in 
favor of the farmers.78  When Zimbabwe failed to comply with the Tribunal’s decision, 
the farmers approached a trial court in South Africa for relief.79   
¶59 vThe case was appealed to the Constitutional Court where Chief Justice Mogoeng, 
writing for the majority, noted that South African common law not did provide for the 
enforcement of international tribunal decisions in South African domestic courts: 
[T]he enforcement provided for in our common law relates only to 
judgments or orders made by a domestic court of a particular foreign 
country. If international courts like the Tribunal were within the 
contemplation of our courts when they developed the common law and 
laid down these foreign judgment-enforcement requirements, the 
condition[s] . . . would have been differently or more appropriately and 
inclusively crafted.80 
¶60  In explaining the need to develop the common law to align it with the spirit of the 
constitutional right of “access to courts” so as to give effect to the Tribunal’s holding, the 
Chief Justice wrote:  
The rule of law is a foundational value of our constitution . . . And it is 
settled law that the rule of law embraces the fundamental right of access to 
courts in section 34 of the Constitution which provides: ‘Everyone has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’  The right to an 
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effective remedy or execution of a court order is recognised as a crucial 
component of the right of access to courts.81 
¶61  Below, the Chief Justice discusses the evolving relationship between the common 
law and the Constitution and what responsibilities he has in promoting the South African 
constitutional experience to the region.  He also reflects on the disconnect between the 
constitutional guarantees and startling inequalities in the country and predicts in which 
area the next socioeconomic legal battle could likely occur.    
¶62  As a jurist, how do you reconcile a progressive Constitution with a Roman-Dutch 
common law that is rooted in the country’s colonial past? 
¶63  The Constitution enjoins us to have regard to our common law.  In fact, much of 
the law we have in South Africa is derived directly from the common law.  At the end of 
the day, however, we must make sure that whatever common law we adopt is aligned 
with the principles embodied in the Constitution.  Remember, the Constitution is the 
supreme law.  Customary law as well the common law must be developed in such a way 
that it is consistent with our Constitution.   
¶64  The challenge is, however, that some of the principles in our common law are 
simply irreconcilable with our Constitution and our Bill of Rights.  When South Africa 
became a constitutional democracy, for instance, the death penalty was still applicable.  
Our Roman-Dutch common law is structured in such a way as to accommodate the death 
penalty, corporal punishment and even the recognition of an offense such as sodomy.  
Our Constitution’s design, however, is such that it is impossible to reconcile it to 
accommodate those common law offenses and therefore we had to abolish them.   
¶65  Does the development of the common law need to be gradual? 
¶66  It depends on the cases before us.  We can only deal with a case depending on how 
it is pleaded, depending on the issues that surface.  That said, there might be a large 
development of the common law depending on the issues. 
¶67  Are you ever concerned that developing the common law too rapidly will threaten 
the values of jurisprudential stability, predictability and administrability? 
¶68  No. 
¶69  Judges, academics and legal practitioners have remarked that South Africa 
possesses one of the most progressive constitutions in the world.  What responsibilities, if 
any, do you have, as head of the judiciary, to promote the South African paradigm 
abroad?   
¶70  Our responsibilities are to scan the environment in Africa and identify those 
countries that are still battling to establish themselves as true constitutional democracies.  
In a very modest and non-confrontational manner, we must look for ways to influence 
those countries, to move in the direction to establish a Constitution similar to ours.   
¶71  I am not sure that we have the best constitution, but I think we have something to 
offer.  We cannot rest on our laurels because if we do not play an active role in promoting 
constitutional democracies in the region, we are then allowing a situation to exist that is 
conducive to coup d'états and dictatorships.  If, however, we help create a human rights 
culture in other African countries backed by constitutional democracies, stability will set 
in, investors will want to go to those countries and people will find employment and stay 
home to develop their own countries. 
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¶72  The South African Constitution is sometimes characterized as “aspirational.”  How 
can the Court close the gap between the constitutional guarantees and the realities on the 
streets? 
¶73  It takes all of the different government role players to close that gap.  What the 
Court can do, however, is interpret the Constitution in a manner so as to ensure that every 
official who has a constitutional responsibility to close that gap—such as cabinet or 
Parliament members—are held accountable.  
¶74  I think that the Court, however, has done fairly well in its efforts to close that gap.  
Look at our judgments dealing with socioeconomic rights.  Look at our judgments on 
health issues.  The typical example is when many people in South Africa needed 
antiretroviral drugs and the government was a bit slack in making sure they were 
accessible to the broader public, the judgment of this Court was such as to require 
government to supply those antiretroviral drugs.82  In the area of housing, for those who 
would have been completely homeless had this Court not intervened and ordered the city 
to provide temporary housing, look at the Blue Moonlight.83   In terms of natural 
resources, look the Agri SA judgment,84 which made sure that the mining industry is 
opened up to all South Africans and that legislative measures are in place to facilitate that 
process are properly understood by government so that there is no excuse for not doing 
what it ought to do to close the gap between the poor and the rich.  
¶75  If you had to pinpoint an area where the gap is the greatest, where would it be? 
¶76  The next major court battles will involve the agricultural sector.  If you look at the 
agricultural sector then you will realize that a very large percentage of [the present] 
commercial farmers are still those from the previously advantaged grouping and those 
from the previously disadvantaged background are still subsistence farmers. For the few 
who have received land through the government’s redistribution processes, it does not 
look like enough was done to empower them to be able to use the land productively.  So, 
I think a lot needs to be done in the area of land redistribution but this must occur in a 
very, very slow and careful process.  
III.   CONCLUSION 
¶77  The first Constitutional Court bench deftly maneuvered the political environment to 
assert its authority and ensure its judicial independence. Its early opinions actualized 
many of the Constitution’s promises for millions of citizens as well as demystified a legal 
world that had been a black hole under the apartheid regime.  Today, South African 
constitutional institutions are no longer fragile or new.  The Court—led for at least the 
next decade by Chief Justice Mogoeng—must navigate impediments as seemingly 
Sisyphean as the first bench encountered but without the type of groundswell political 
and public backing that erupted from the euphoric days of the mid-1990s.  The 
challenges, discussed above, are manifold: a growing ideological divide on the Court; 
slipping faith in the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary; resistance towards 
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transforming the bench; and convincing a majority of the country that, they too, are 
entitled to guarantees in their Constitution.  Government will continue to question the 
Court’s reach.  At Mogoeng’s swearing in, President Jacob Zuma, advocated for a more 
restrained judiciary: “[t]he powers conferred on the courts cannot be regarded as superior 
to the powers resulting from a mandate given by the people in a popular vote.”85 
¶78  As Mogoeng indicated, the Court cannot carry out the transformative project on its 
own, but it does need to dispel any notion that liberal constitutionalism is an impediment 
to social betterment.  To do so, it must continue to boldly develop the common law to 
align it with the foundational principles of freedom, equality and dignity, it must 
encourage access to hearings for members of the press and public, and it must neither 
become subsumed in the racialization and politicization of judicial transformation nor shy 
away from holding political actors accountable to their constitutional responsibilities.  
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